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Phenomenology’s attention to the theme of animality has focused not on animal life in 
general but rather on the animal dimension of the human and its contested relation with 
humanity as such. Phenomenology thereby reproduces Agamben’s “anthropological 
machine” by which humanity is constructed through the “inclusive exclusion” of its 
animality. The alternative to this “inclusive exclusion” is not, however, a return to kinship 
or commonality, but rather an intensification of the constitutive paradox of our own inner 
animality, understood in terms of the anonymous, corporeal subject of perception that 
lives a different temporality than that of first-person consciousness. This provides us 
with an entirely different context for encounter with non-human others, insofar as they 
speak through our own voices and gaze out through our own eyes. This position is 
developed through a reading, first, of the proximity of Merleau-Ponty’s early work with 
that of Max Scheler, who paradigmatically reduces human animality to bare life. 
Merleau-Ponty differentiates himself from Scheler by emphasizing, in The Structure of 
Behavior, that life cannot be integrated into spirit without remainder. Merleau-Ponty’s 
later work thinks this remainder as the ineliminable gap and delay in the auto-affection 
of the body and as a chiasmic exchange that anticipates Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of “becoming animal.” This remainder of life within consciousness is the 
immemorial past of one’s own animality. It follows that our “inner animality” is neither 
singular nor plural but a kind of pack that speaks through the voice that I take to be 
mine. Furthermore, in the exchange of looks between myself and a non-human other, 
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If phenomenology has played a key role over the past century in re-opening the 
question of the animal, this is because it has continually struggled to describe the 
animal dimension of our own humanity, that stratum of our nature that we putatively 
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share with our non-human kin. This manner of posing the “question of the animal” is 
altogether distinct from a phenomenological description of the lives and experiences of 
non-human organisms on their own terms. Phenomenology has, of course, drawn upon 
and sometimes inspired such descriptions, particularly in the works of Wolfgang Köhler, 
Jakob von Uexküll, and Frederik Buytendijk, among others. But such accounts are 
typically appropriated for the more central debate over our own animality and its 
relationship with what makes us specifically human. The heart of the matter is not the 
animals outside, but rather our own immanent animal nature, lived as both an origin and 
an ongoing inheritance, as our immemorial past as well as what we must transcend in 
order to be human in the present. In short, the phenomenological debates over 
animality must be read as an episode in the history of what Giorgio Agamben calls the 
“anthropological machine,” a set of mirrors by which we recognize a reflection of 
ourselves in the animal that we are not and thereby constitute ourselves as human 
through its exclusion (2004, 26-27).  
 Consider as a starting point Husserl’s extensive analyses, in Ideas II, of the 
constitution of “Animal Nature,” which would later prove so influential on Merleau-Ponty. 
These studies concern what Husserl calls “animalia,” human as well as non-human, and 
he is explicit that we should take the human subject here as one specimen of the more 
inclusive category of “animal subjects” (1952, 120-21/1989, 128). What Husserl 
investigates under this heading of “animal nature” is nothing zoological, and references 
to non-human animals in this text are rare.1 This is because Husserl’s primary concern 
is not with non-human animals but precisely with “man” as a “natural reality,” that is, 
with the human considered abstractly in terms of its merely animal being (1952, 
143/1989, 151). And so, when Husserl poses for himself the question, “how does the  
animal Ego develop into the human Ego?,” he is not asking a question addressed by 
evolutionary naturalism, since the animal in question here is precisely not a non-human 
organism but a stratum in the constitution of the full human person (1952, 339/1989, 
350-51). 
 Now, on the one hand, it is possible to interpret Husserl’s descriptions of our 
participation in a common animal nature as a reversal of the Cartesian legacy, thereby 
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restoring the classical site for animal sensibility as an ontological stratum in its own 
right.2 Insofar as it undermines what Frans De Waal (1999, cited in Sober 2005, 85) 
terms  “anthropodenial”—an unjustified refusal to recognize nonhuman cognition that 
has blinkered our scientific and philosophical encounters with animals for centuries—
perhaps we can expect to find here the basis for a renewed sense of our continuity with 
animals, one motivated otherwise than by the usual Darwinian story of our common 
animal origins. According to David Wood, for example, Husserl’s rediscovery of our 
common “animal sensibility” vindicates our capacity to empathize with our fellow 
sentient creatures, making this not an “anthropocentric” projection but a “biocentric” 
one, rooted as it is in our shared bodily natures.3 For Wood, and he is hardly alone in 
this claim, our shared animal life bespeaks a common kinship with implications that are 
undeniably ethical. 
 And yet, on the other hand, it is precisely this common animal sensibility that is 
repeatedly contested in the development of phenomenology after Husserl, in different 
ways and with different stakes, by Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, and Levinas. Arguably, it 
is only Merleau-Ponty, among the major phenomenologists of the twentieth century, 
who endorses something like an animal stratum of the human and finds in it the basis 
for what he will eventually call a “strange kinship” (1995, 339/2003, 271). Yet, even for 
Merleau-Ponty, such a kinship is difficult. This is because the animal sensibility of the 
human being is not simply one given stratum to which another, “human” layer could be 
added, as we might think from Husserl’s gesture of renewing the classical discourse of 
perceptual and rational souls. The animal level of human life is not simply identical or 
continuous with the lives of other creatures. As Merleau-Ponty succinctly puts it in The 
Structure of Behavior, “the word ‘life’ does not have the same meaning in animality and 
humanity” (1942, 188/1983, 174). Or, even more strongly, “vital behavior as such 
disappears” once our animality has been integrated into the higher and more 
encompassing gestalt of the human order (1942, 195/1983, 181). Here Merleau-Ponty’s 
account of our vital behavior comes dangerously close to the “bare life” that, according 
to Agamben, is produced by the anthropological machine’s logic of inclusive exclusion. 
Such life is neither an animal nor a human life but only a “state of exception, a zone of 
Konturen VI (2014) 
 
25 
indeterminacy” at the turn of the hinge between our humanity and our animality (2004, 
37-38). Is such a bare life all that remains of the animal nature integrated into our 
human selves, and if so, can we still speak of kinship in any meaningful sense? 
 We address this question in three stages: first, it is instructive to consider 
Merleau-Ponty’s close proximity with Scheler, whose remarks on the human-animal 
difference Merleau-Ponty cites frequently in The Structure of Behavior. It is Scheler, in 
The Human Place in the Cosmos, who first writes that “human beings can be more than 
animals and less than animals but they can never be an animal” (1947, 33/2009, 21). 
This is because, for Scheler, what defines the human essence is its participation in 
spirit, which is precisely a saying-no to life. Merleau-Ponty echoes Scheler’s claim when 
he writes that “Man can never be an animal; his life is always more or less integrated 
than that of an animal” (1942, 196/1983, 181). Yet the reference to integration here 
marks a crucial difference: for Merleau-Ponty, the integration that defines the human 
being may wholly transform life, but it cannot do so without remainder. This remainder 
represents the contingency of death, what can never be fully integrated, and which is 
even necessary for the staking of one’s life, in contrast with Scheler’s sacrifice of life. 
 Secondly, the admission of the contingency of death into Merleau-Ponty’s 
hierarchy of Gestalts destabilizes it, toppling it over. This is why Merleau-Ponty’s later 
work speaks of a lateral rather than a vertical transcendence, and why that 
transcendence can be understood as intertwining or chiasm. In the chiasmic relation, 
the animal becomes me as I become it, bringing this exchange very close to what 
Deleuze and Guattari call “blocks of becoming” (1980, 290-92/1987, 237-39). But this 
moment of exchange, the intersection of the chiasm, is a moment that exceeds the 
exchange itself. To understand this moment, we need to consider its strange temporality 
as a generative passivity. This generative moment is what Merleau-Ponty, in 
Phenomenology of Perception (1945/2012), names the “anonymous,” the someone [On] 
who perceives within me without coinciding with my personal self, my Ego. This 
anonymous someone is precisely my animal life, the life of my body as a natural self. 
But this means that my animal self lives a different temporality than my personal ego, a 
time of Aeon or of a past that has never been present. 
Konturen VI (2014) 
 
26 
 We consider, finally, the implications of this immemorial animality. First, my 
animal life, in its rhythmic generality, is neither singular nor plural. As the indefinite 
pronoun suggests, the “someone” who perceives within me is indefinite, a virtual 
multiplicity. Second, this animal someone, as the “logos of the sensible world” (Merleau-
Ponty 1995, 219/2003, 166), is the generative ground for my personal self, and even for 
my ability to speak. We might say, then, that my speech is precisely the speaking 
through me of my own animal past. As Merleau-Ponty writes in the preface to Signs, “All 
those we have loved, detested, known, or simply glimpsed speak through our voice” 
(1960, 27/ 2007, 334). Lastly, if we are correct to identify the anonymous, natural self of 
the body with our own animal nature, then it is precisely this animal nature that 
perceives; the animals within us are the lives of “my eyes, hands, and ears, which are 
so many natural selves” (1945, 250/2012, 224). And this means that, when I gaze into 
the eyes of another, non-human animal, it is the animals within me, the animals of my 
own generative past, that look back. This promises a deeper prospect for mutual 
encounter than any kinship in the present can offer. 
 
1. Contingencies of life and death 
As we have noted above, the logic of the anthropological machine as described by 
Agamben concerns the relationship between animality and humanity within the human: 
to be human is precisely not to be animal, and especially not the animal that we already 
are. In other words, our “anthropogenesis,” our constitution as human, requires the 
containment and policing of the animal within. What is at stake, in Agamben’s terms, is 
our own internal negotiation of the relation between zoe and bios, the biological and the 
biographical. The traditional logic of this relation is one of “exclusive inclusion,” such 
that animal life is what is within us while not being us, while remaining unsynthesizable 
with our humanity and in need of its sovereign control. Now, Agamben explicitly traces 
the operation of this logic through the thought of Heidegger, as  “the philosopher of the 
twentieth century who more than any other strove to separate man from the living being” 
(2004, 39), but he otherwise makes no mention of the phenomenological tradition. We 
can nevertheless trace the same anthropo-logic through the accounts of the human-
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animal relation in Scheler and the early Merleau-Ponty. For example, Scheler defines 
“spirit,” which for him essentially differentiates humans from animals, as “opposite 
anything we call life, including life in the human being” (1947, 39/2009, 26). This is why 
animals remain “ecstatically immersed” (1947, 39/2009, 27) in their environments, as 
the correlates of their drives, while humans can detach themselves from their biological 
lives sufficiently to achieve an objective perspective on the world and to choose values 
that run counter to biological needs. The key point here is that spirit, on Scheler’s own 
description, opposes biological life in general, including human biological life, so that the 
essence of the human being is defined precisely by the “exclusive inclusion” of its own 
inner animality.  
 When Merleau-Ponty puts forward his own position on the essential distinction 
between humans and animals in his first book, The Structure of Behavior, he frequently 
cites Scheler, including the very passages to which we have just referred. What he 
adopts are Scheler’s descriptions of the characteristics that are exclusively human, 
namely, the orientation toward truth and objectivity, the transformation of an 
environment into a world, the capacity for self-reflection, and so on. Yet Merleau-Ponty 
also distances himself from Scheler’s account insofar as Merleau-Ponty treats spirit not 
as the negation of life but as its integration into a more complex Gestalt. On this view, 
life and spirit are continuous, since both are simply different stages or degrees in the 
integration of form (1942, 143/1983, 133). Yet they are also discontinuous, since the 
emergence of a higher level of integration destroys the lower-order Gestalt while 
incorporating it. Life as such, life in the animal sense of the term, disappears once it is 
integrated into the properly human dialectic. And so, for Merleau-Ponty, “one cannot 
speak of the body and of life in general, but only of the animal body and animal life, and 
of the human body and of human life” (1942, 195-96/1983, 181). Ultimately, human life 
and the human body do not exist as such in a fully integrated human being; their 
autonomous existence reappears only in cases of pathological disintegration (1942, 
218-19/1983, 202-203). Consequently, for Merleau-Ponty as for Scheler, what properly 
characterizes the human being will be the disappearance, we might say the 
“spiritualization,” of zoe or biological life. Despite the differences between Scheler’s 
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negation of life by spirit and Merleau-Ponty’s integration of life into spirit, then, we seem 
to arrive here at a very traditional hierarchical teleology according to which the human is 
precisely the inclusion of animal life through its exclusion.  
 There is more to this story, however, and what truly differentiates Merleau-
Ponty’s account from that of Scheler turns out to be less the focus on integration than 
the inevitability of disintegration. This emphasis on disintegration is introduced in the 
very last section of the text, where Merleau-Ponty addresses what he calls the “truth of 
naturalism,” and it ultimately effects a reversal of his position up to that point. Here 
Merleau-Ponty is concerned with the relation between, on the one hand, consciousness 
as a structure that emerges through the integration of the subordinate structures of 
matter and life, and, on the other hand, consciousness as “universal milieu,” or as we 
might say today, as the dative of manifestation for the disclosure of anything 
whatsoever.4 In other words, he is addressing the same paradox that emerges at the 
end of Husserl’s Ideas II, the paradox that Paul Ricoeur (1967, 76) would later call the 
“most embarrassing question” of this text, namely, the relationship between spirit and 
the transcendental ego. Now, when Merleau-Ponty wrote The Structure of Behavior, he 
had not yet read Ideas II, which makes his resolution of the problem here all the more 
interesting. His solution, in brief, is to privilege structure over signification, that is, to 
emphasize the contingency of the emergence of consciousness from matter and life, 
and to make this emergent consciousness—what he calls “perceptual consciousness”—
the condition and limit of any putatively universal consciousness. It is because 
consciousness as “universal milieu” remains an ideal promise rather than an actual 
achievement that Merleau-Ponty will later say that the most important lesson of the 
transcendental reduction is the “impossibility of a complete reduction” (1945, viii/2012, 
lxxvii). The reduction can never be complete, and the transcendental ego remains an 
ideal promise, because a complete and final integration of matter and life into spirit is 
unattainable. In Merleau-Ponty’s words,  
there is always a duality which reappears at one level or another . . . integration 
is never absolute and it always fails—at a higher level in the writer, at a lower 
level in the aphasic. . . . This duality is not a simple fact; it is founded in 
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principle—all integration presupposing the normal functioning of subordinated 
formations, which always demand their own due. (1942, 227-227/1983, 210) 
The subordinated gestalts demand their due because they have never truly 
disappeared; our animal past is never truly liquidated or spiritualized but continues to 
constitute our present lives from within. 
 To clarify the limits of this integration of the past of matter and life into the 
present of spirit, we might develop further Merleau-Ponty's own comparison of 
ontological structure with musical form. Throughout The Structure of Behavior, Merleau-
Ponty relies on the figure of melody to illustrate the unity of Gestalts, culminating in his 
claim that "the world, in those of its sectors which realize a structure, is comparable to a 
symphony" (1942, 142; 1983, 132). In other words, the hierarchical integration of forms 
into the meaningful whole of nature is like the arrangement of musical phrases and 
counterpoints into a larger composition. This insight on Merleau-Ponty's part has its 
parallels in the "composition theory of nature" proposed by Estonian ethologist Jakob 
von Uexküll (2010), as well as the Gestalt ontology of Deep Ecologist Arne Naess 
(1989, esp. Ch. 2). For our purposes here, what is intriguing about Merleau-Ponty’s use 
of the musical comparison is that the integration of forms occurs by recursion. On this 
view, mind is a kind of second-order melody that transposes into its symbolic structure 
the “melodies” of matter and life that are its own subordinated gestalts, its own past.  
 Now, as we have just noted, this integration of gestalts is contingent and never 
fully realized, since the subordinated gestalts retain their historical density and inertia. If 
the melody of life integrates the melody of matter, and mind consists of a recursive 
expression of such melodies, then at every stage of integration, there is a condensation 
of the entire history of lines of song into denser phrasings. This follows from Merleau-
Ponty's recognition that physical gestalts bear within themselves a reference to the 
entire history of the universe as their emergent condition (1942, 150-55/1983, 139-143), 
while, at the vital level, the contrapuntal melody of every organism folds into itself, as an 
organic memory, its entire evolutionary history. Every phrase and every note of each 
organic melody is therefore rich with the micromelodies of this accumulated history, an 
immemorial past that could never be entirely unpacked. Think of the phrase of a melody 
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as having a structure like Mandelbrot's fractal coastline, such that, as you approach it 
more closely, you find the same degree of intricately enfolded structure at every scale. 
Furthermore, since each integration and transposition is only partial, the synthesis by 
which the past is folded into the present will always be selective and creative, that is, 
expressive: it will simplify along one dimension, creatively improvise along another, and 
leave remainders throughout. So, the fact that integration always fails at one point or 
another is just the obverse of the fact that this symphony of gestalts is incessantly 
recreating its past as well as itself, carrying along its immemorial history while 
constantly recomposing it. And it is precisely within this ongoing folding of the entire 
history of nature's symphony into the very next line of every behavioral melody—and the 
iterative turn by which one melody expresses this process of becoming as such—that 
we must locate the hinge between our humanity and our animality. Our more-or-less 
composed human selves carry with them, in kernel, the sedimented stages through 
which we have passed, so that, even to the extent that we do sublimate our animal 
natures, we remain perennially liable to them. 
 What truly distinguishes Merleau-Ponty’s account from that of Husserl or Scheler 
is precisely this ongoing resistance of matter and life within spirit, since, for Merleau-
Ponty, the pure spirit of Scheler or the Transcendental Ego of Husserl would eliminate 
all meaning for death. The truth of naturalism, of mind-body dualism, and of death is 
that every integration is liable to the “contingency of the lived” and is consequently 
temporary and fragile at best (1942, 240/1983, 223). Nor is this a merely external 
limitation on what would otherwise remain an ideal possibility, since the contingency of 
the lived, as a point of passage in spirit’s historical development, introduces that 
contingency into the very structure of spirit. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “consciousness 
experiences its inherence in an organism at each moment,” and this inherence is 
nothing other than the “presence to consciousness of its proper history and of the 
dialectical stages which it has traversed” (1942, 224-25/1983, 208). We are human, 
then, only as having been animal and only as being still animal in ways that exceed our 
efforts to take them into account. Since our animality can never finally be exhausted or 
excluded, Merleau-
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only ever a question of “staking” one’s life as a deeper way of living (1942, 240/1983, 
224). If phenomenology can contribute to the désoeuvrement of the anthropological 
machine, it may be precisely through such a putting into play of our own animality.  
 
II. Lateral overcoming and the animal past 
Even if the Gestalt ontology that Merleau-Ponty proposes in The Structure of Behavior 
admits, in the end, the historical and contingent character of spirit, it nevertheless says 
little in positive terms about the autonomy of life, that is, about the animal that continues 
to haunt our humanity from within. The procession from matter, through life, to spirit is 
presented here as teleologically oriented toward the achievement of genuine 
individuality, so that the contingency of life is always presented under a negative aspect, 
for instance as the “perpetual menace” that affords death its meaning (1942, 240/1983, 
223). But to take the contingency and autonomy of life seriously destabilizes the 
hierarchical arrangement of Gestalts, which is why the vertical transcendence of 
Merleau-Ponty’s first book gives way to the lateral transgressions of his later work, 
where he no longer speaks of the integration of Gestalts but rather of the intertwining of 
chiasms. In his lecture courses on Nature, Merleau-Ponty continues to say that the 
human being has “another manner of being a body” than the animal, but this relation is 
to be understood as Ineinander, as a being in-one-another, rather than as a simple 
hierarchy (1995, 276-77/2003, 214). “The relation of the human and animality,” he 
writes, “is not a hierarchical relation, but lateral, an overcoming that does not abolish 
kinship” (1995, 335/2003, 268; cf. 1995, 338-39/2003, 271).  
As an illustration of this lateral kinship, Merleau-Ponty refers to Inuit masks that 
depict “the original double nature,” with human and animal doubles inscribed either 
simultaneously or alternately by means of movable flaps. On Merleau-Ponty’s 
interpretation, this “primordial indivision and metamorphosis” offers an “extraordinary 
representation of the animal as variant of humanity and of humanity as variant of 
animality” (1995, 277 note a/2003, 307n11). With this example, Merleau-Ponty’s 
interpretation of the human-animal relation comes very close to that of Deleuze and 
Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus, where they describe the bi-directional transformations 
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and exchanges between humans and animals as forming “blocks of becoming.” For 
Deleuze and Guattari, becomings-animal are perfectly real—neither fictional nor mere 
imitations—even if “it is clear that the human being does not ‘really’ become an animal 
any more than the animal ‘really’ becomes something else.” The reality of the becoming 
does not hinge on some product that would result, since “becoming produces nothing 
other than itself.” “What is real,” they write, “is the becoming itself, the block of 
becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes” 
(1980, 291/1987, 238).  If a veritable becoming-animal has no subject and no term apart 
from the becoming itself, if it is the very event of mutual transformation, then such 
becoming has the structure of a chiasmus: a becoming-animal of the human that is a 
becoming-human of the animal. 
 Now, despite this parallel, Deleuze and Guattari’s account leaves unexplained 
the sense in which this chiasmic event should be understood, for Merleau-Ponty, as an 
“overcoming,” even if this is lateral rather than hierarchical. We know that the figure for 
this “overcoming” is the reflexivity of the body itself, according to Merleau-Ponty’s 
famous descriptions—inspired, once again, by Husserl’s Ideas II—of one hand touching 
another (1995, 340/2003, 273). Although Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of the touching-
touched relation are familiar from The Visible and the Invisible and other texts, they 
receive a slightly different inflection in the courses on Nature, where he is specifically 
concerned with accounting for the “animal of perceptions.” Here, Merleau-Ponty 
describes the écart, the gap, between the touching hand and the one it touches, noting 
that “their reciprocity breaks up at the moment that it is going to be born.” But this 
failure, he continues, 
is precisely the very apprehension of my body in its duplicity, as thing and vehicle 
of my relation to things. There are two “sides” of an experience, conjugated and 
incompossible, but complementary. Their unity is irrecusable; it is simply like the 
invisible hinge on which two experiences are articulated—a self torn apart. (1995, 
285/2003, 223) 
We can see from this figure of the touching-touched, which Merleau-Ponty calls 
“reflection in figural form” and takes to be exemplary of the lateral relation of Ineinander 
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(1995, 340/2003, 273), that “overcoming” here no longer means integration or dialectical 
synthesis. It is rather a kind of internal tearing apart or dehiscence, a bi-directional 
mediation that converts each term into its other while maintaining their non-coincident 
identity. And so, when Merleau-Ponty speaks of the “man-animality intertwining,” this 
expresses a parallel reversibility and duplicity that is resolvable neither into identity nor 
difference (1964, 328/1968, 274). We are human, then, only insofar as our humanity 
enters into kaleidoscopic exchange with our animality, and insofar as our animality 
within enters into exchange with the animality without. 
 In the case of the two hands touching, their unity amounts to no more than the 
“invisible hinge” at the jointure of their exchange. It is worth noting that this unity, the 
invisible hinge, is not itself anything that can be touched; the unity is a kind of residue or 
remainder that conditions touch while remaining absent from it. This absent remainder 
has a temporal meaning, insofar as it is always in the past; even while it is generative of 
the present, it is encountered only in the mode of having slipped away. To put this 
another way, when one hand touches another, the hand that is actively touching—the 
subject hand—is always too late to touch the agency of the object hand, which has 
submerged itself into the things of the world. The object hand becomes for it an 
unpresentable past. This returns us to the problem of the time of our own animality. As 
we remember from The Structure of Behavior, our animal life was there understood as 
the constitutive history of spirit, the traces of its process of integration, which was 
experienced precisely as its present inherence in an organism. When integration is 
replaced by intertwining, this animal past becomes precisely the pre-reflective moment 
of our immersion into the perceptual world, the time of our “perceptual consciousness.” 
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty calls this time of the pre-reflective an 
“original past, past that has never been a present” (1945, 280/2012, 252). Our animal 
lives inhabit our present precisely as such an immemorial past, a past that is generative 
of this present while pursuing a distinct temporality of its own. 
 
III. Voices of the animal past 
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To understand my association of our animal lives with the immemorial past, consider 
Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between the “biological” and “personal” self in 
Phenomenology of Perception. Here Merleau-Ponty describes our biological existence 
as an “innate complex”: “my organism—as a pre-personal adhesion to the general form 
of the world, as an anonymous and general existence—plays the role of an innate 
complex beneath the level of my personal life” (1945, 99/2012, 86). Although there may 
be times when my human life fully integrates my biological organism, as The Structure 
of Behavior had suggested, now Merleau-Ponty recognizes that such situations are 
relatively rare. Instead, as he writes, “most of the time personal existence represses the 
organism without being able to transcend it or to renounce it, and without being able to 
reduce the organism to itself or itself to the organism” (1945, 100/2012, 86). The 
language here of “complex” and “repression” recalls Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of the 
pathological failures of full human integration in The Structure of Behavior (1942, 
192/1983, 177). But now the autonomous structure of our biological organism has its 
own integrity; in fact, as Merleau-Ponty’s text proceeds, we learn that it is precisely this 
anonymous and general existence that is the subject of perception. Concerning the 
anonymous self who perceives, Merleau-Ponty writes: “if I wanted to express perceptual 
experience with precision, I would have to say that one perceives in me, and not that I 
perceive. Every sensation includes a seed of dream or depersonalization, as we 
experience through this sort of stupor into which it puts us when we truly live at the level 
of sensation” (1945, 249/2012, 223). Merleau-Ponty emphasizes here that this 
anonymous "someone" who senses in and through me is distinct from my personal self, 
from the self who says "I," but is rather that assemblage of "natural selves" that has 
already sided with and synchronized with the world. For instance, on the very next page 
Merleau-Ponty writes:   
I grasp through sensation, on the margins of my personal life and my own acts, a 
given life of consciousness from which these later determinations emerge, the life 
of my eyes, hands, and ears, which are so many natural selves. Each time that I 
experience a sensation, I experience that it does not concern my own being—the 
one for which I am responsible and upon which I decide—but rather another self 
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that has already sided with the world, that is already open to certain of its aspects 
and synchronized with them. (1945, 250/2012, 224) 
“Synchronized” is a key term here, since the anonymous “one” of sensation lives in a 
“prehistory,” the “past of all pasts,” which is the time of our organic rhythms, such as the 
beating of the heart (1945, 277, 293, 100/2012, 250, 265, 87). This cyclical time, 
Merleau-Ponty tells us, “is the time of nature with which we coexist,” an “absolute past 
of nature” incommensurate with the narrative, linear time of the personal self (1945, 
517, 160/2012,479, 139).  
 This allows us to make sense of the famous lines with which Merleau-Ponty 
concludes his chapter on sensing, to the effect that reflection only fully grasps itself 
when it takes into account its own pre-reflective history, a history that constitutes for it 
“an original past, a past that has never been present” (1945, 280/2012, 252). This pre-
reflective history is the immemorial past of nature, a nature with which we coexist at the 
level of sensation, but which can never be fully recuperated by the reflective operations 
of the personal self. It is, in short, the absolute past of our own biological life, of our 
inner animality. As Alia Al-Saji has argued, it is necessary to distinguish here between 
sensibility and perception proper. “Sensory life,” Al-Saji writes, “would be that ‘primitive 
complicit[y] with the world’ which is the “condition for the possibility of perceptual 
experience” but remains distinct from perception proper insofar as it is “anterior to the 
distinctions of subject and object and to the divisions between the senses” (2008, 47, 
48). As the generative ground of experience, sensibility so understood cannot be a 
conscious experience; it cannot occur within personal time, the time of reflection, 
precisely because it makes such time possible. It therefore represents, for reflection, an 
im-possible and irrecuperable past, a past that can never be made present. This 
impossible and immemorial past is precisely that of our own animality, the subject of our 
perceptions that inevitably escapes and exceeds our reflective gaze. 
 Now, several interesting implications follow from this immemorial temporality of 
our animal lives. First, as is already implied by Merleau-Ponty’s use of the impersonal 
pronoun and his description of the natural selves of our senses, our biological lives 
exceed the distinction between the singular and the plural. This brings us close to 
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Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that “Becoming-animal always involves a pack, a band, a 
population, a peopling, in short, a multiplicity.” As they explain, “We do not become 
animal without a fascination for the pack, for multiplicity. A fascination for the Outside? 
Or is the multiplicity that fascinates us already related to a multiplicity dwelling within 
us?” (1980, 292-93/1987, 239-40). Our fascination with the pack would therefore be the 
resonance that it forms with our own anonymous multiplicity. And this introduction of an 
immemorial past into the very folding of the melody of life transforms what Deleuze and 
Guattari have called the “refrain.” The refrain, you may recall, is a periodic repetition, a 
manner of oscillating or vibrating, that introduces and dissolves relations and 
becomings. Refrains come together to form milieus, or environments, as spatiotemporal 
blocks for ordering chaos, and living things are the intersections of just such milieus. 
When Deleuze and Guattari speak of “becoming-animal,” they have in mind an 
appropriation or an exchange of refrains, so that, while the human being takes on the 
style of an animal—the speed and slowness, or the relation between movement and 
rest, of the animal’s elements—the animal is equally transformed into something else. 
So, for example, in their favorite case of the composer Olivier Messian, the territorial 
breeding call of a song thrush—its refrain—is de-territorialized or extracted from its 
environment in order to be re-territorialized as notes in a musical composition. So far, so 
good. But according to our account of our own animality as an immemorial past, what 
Deleuze and Guattari say about the refrain must be supplemented by Deleuze’s 
account, in Difference and Repetition (1968/1994) of involuntary memory. More 
precisely, becoming-animal involves a kind of Proustian reminiscence of our own animal 
past, as a past that was never present, a past that could never present itself to our 
human awareness. This involuntary memory points toward a pure past that would be 
the past of life as such, the memory of its evolutionary unfolding. On Elizabeth Grosz’s 
(2008) reading, this means that we should see in the refrain a production and 
intensification of desire, precisely the desire that drives sexual selection. This desire 
cannot be separated, we are suggesting, from a slippage between the personal self, 
namely the I that occupies its narrative position in the present, and the multiple we that 
takes up an immeasurable and infinite past—a past stretching all the way back to the 
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very elements and to the geological dimensions of time. 
 Secondly, it is this anonymous multiplicity that expresses itself through the voice 
that I superficially take to be “mine.” The self-coincidence of the voice has, of course, 
long represented the pure auto-affection of consciousness, since, when I speak to 
myself silently, I hear myself speaking with an apparent immediacy, as if my voice 
required no passage through the world. But, as Leonard Lawlor has argued, the purity 
of this auto-affection is interrupted from the first by the voices of others: 
It is an irreducible or essential necessity that the silent words I form contain 
repeatable traits. This irreducible necessity means that, when I speak to myself, I 
speak with the sounds of others. In other words, it means that I find in myself 
other voices, which come from the past. . . . The problem therefore with the belief 
that interior monologue is my own is that others’ voices contaminate the hearing 
of myself speaking. Just as my present moment is always already old, my interior 
monologue is never my own. (2009, 18) 
Now, we have already noted a very similar remark from Merleau-Ponty himself, when 
he writes that “All those we have loved, detested, known, or simply glimpsed speak 
through our voice” (1960, 27/2007, 334). But now we must recognize that these voices 
from our past are not limited to the human voices of our narrative, personal history. 
They include the anonymous voices of an immemorial pre-history, the voices of the 
animals that we will have been.  
 Lastly, if we are correct to identify the “someone” who perceives within us with 
the animal dimension of our being, it follows that—in the same way that animals speak 
through our voice—they also look out through our eyes. The “someone” or the “we” that 
perceives within me, that is co-natural with the world, is the multiplicity of my own 
animal becoming. But this means that, when I look at an animal and it looks back at me, 
what looks out through my eyes, from an impossible past, is my own animal organism. 
“And yet, sometimes a silent animal looks up at us and silently looks through us,” Rilke 
writes in the eighth of the Duino Elegies (1989, 67). Yet perhaps when this animal sees 
through our personal self, it precisely sees into our animal self. And what it sees there is 
not a kinship but instead a withdrawal. John Sallis describes the moment of exceeding 
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the look that emerges at the crossing of two glances: “A living being that not only has a 
look but also looks back at the viewer . . . may, through this compounded look, show 
itself as exceeding its look. In the eyes of the other, one sees that the other, no less 
than oneself, exceeds the look offered to one’s vision. In such cases there are traces of 
a withdrawn depth that escapes the look. . . .” (2012, 141). This withdrawn depth in the 
look of the other is essentially invisible, just as the écart of the two touches is intangible, 
and for the same reason: that rather than a presence to ourselves, we are essentially a 
self torn apart, torn between the human and the animal. 
 
 
                                                
1 We do, however, find a few interesting paragraphs devoted to a playful cat who is seen 
“as a sensing and animated Body,” but who does not, in this text, manage to look back. 
See 1952, 175-76; 1989, 185-186. 
2 When Husserl introduces the distinction between material and animal nature, he refers 
us back to the Cartesian contrast between res extensa and res cogitans (§12). Yet 
Descartes has explicitly denied that any “vegetative or sensitive soul” could be 
attributed to the animal body, thereby stripping it of any attributes beyond those of mere 
extension, while reserving the rational soul for the human being alone (1985, 134). 
3 This is the conclusion that David Wood draws, noting Husserl’s reference to our 
“animate organism” as the basis for intersubjectivity in Cartesian Meditations. See 
Wood 2004, 140. 
4 The expression “dative of manifestation,” first introduced by Thomas Prufer, concerns 
the “to me” character of primal presencing, i.e., the I-pole of the I-world correlation. See 
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